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Abstract. We introduce a new methodology based on refinement for
testing the functional correctness of hardware and low-level software.
Our methodology overcomes several major drawbacks of the de facto
testing methodologies used in industry: (1) it is difficult to determine
completeness of the properties and tests under consideration (2) defining
oracles for tests is expensive and error-prone (3) properties are defined
in terms of low-level designs. Our approach compiles a formal refinement
conjecture into a runtime check that is performed during simulation.
We describe our methodology, discuss algorithmic issues, and provide
experimental validation using a 5-stage RISCV pipelined microprocessor
and hypervisor.
1 Introduction
Hardware and low-level software designs continue to increase in complexity and
as a result verification has become the dominant design cost. According to a
recent study by Foster about 70% of designs include embedded processors, SoC
designs with over 100 IP blocks are not uncommon, the mean number of veri-
fication engineers is more than the mean number of design engineers, and even
design engineers spend about half their time on verification [11].
In this paper, we introduce a new approach to dynamic verification, based
on refinement. In the last decade, refinement-based methodology has been suc-
cessfully used to statically verify correctness of several practical systems like
pipelined microprocessors, operating systems microkernels and distributed sys-
tems [15,12]. Refinement shows that the behaviors of a concrete system, say a
pipelined machine, are suitably related to the behaviors of an abstract machine,
say an instruction set architecture, that serves as the specification [23]. The idea
behind our method is simple. We compile a refinement conjecture into a runtime
check that is performed during simulation. This allows us to check for func-
tional correctness during testing using only this one check. To our knowledge,
we are the first to propose and study the application of a theory of refinement
for dynamic verification. Our approach addresses several challenges facing in-
dustry [10,6,5,9]. First, we target functional correctness. According to Foster,
50% of flaws resulting in respins are due to logic or functional correctness flaws.
Second, it is difficult to determine if the set of properties and tests under consid-
eration is complete: the Foster study that shows that over 40% of of functional
flaws are due to incomplete or incorrect specifications. Third, defining oracles for
2tests is expensive and error-prone: the Foster study shows that verification en-
gineers spend 24% of their time creating tests and running simulations. Finally,
properties and tests are defined in terms of low-level designs, so modifications
during the design cycle lead to, possibly significant, changes to the properties
being tested. The Foster study shows that over 40% of the functional flaws are
due to change in the specification. This is undesirable. Furthermore, the effort
to maintain properties for an industrial design can often be very large [24] and
cannot be under estimated.
We briefly review refinement in Section 2, followed by the introduction of a
running example in Section 3. We present our refinement-based testing method
in Section 4, which includes algorithms, a theorem of correctness, some optimiza-
tions, and a discussion of the overhead incurred by our method. Experimental
validation using two case studies on pipeline machine verification and a case
study on the verification of a hypervisor is the topic of Section 5. After a discus-
sion and related work, in Section 6, we end with conclusions and future work in
Section 7.
2 Refinement
Refinement allows us to show that a low-level concrete system correctly im-
plements a high-level abstract system by showing that every behavior of the
concrete system is allowed by the abstract system. To bridge the gap between
the concrete and abstract systems, we use a refinement map, a function that
maps concrete states to the abstract states they correspond to. For example, the
commitment refinement map [21] takes as an input a pipelined machine state and
returns the ISA (Instruction Set Architecture) state obtained by invalidating all
partially executed instructions and projecting out the programmer-observable
components.
Many different notions of refinement exist ([17,13]) and our approach is quite
general, but in this paper we will use WEB (Well-founded Equivalence Bisimu-
lation) refinement [17], a notion of correctness that is well studied in the context
of hardware verification [18]. In this section, we provide a brief introduction
to WEB refinement. We start by defining transition systems (TS), a general,
language-agnostic setting, that we use to model systems.
Definition 1. A TS M is a three-tuple 〈S,→, L〉, consisting of a set of states
S, a transition relation →, and a labeling function L whose domain is S.
The labeling function is used to specify what is externally observable in a
state. Transition systems are both simple and general, e.g., → is an arbitrary
relation and there are no cardinality restrictions on S. Thus transition systems
can be used to model infinite state machines and unbounded nondeterminism.
We now define WEB-refinement, which is defined with respect to a single
transition system: the disjoint union (⊎) of the concrete and abstract TSs.
Definition 2. Let MC = 〈SC ,
C
−→, LC〉 be the transition system of a concrete
system, MA = 〈SA,
A
−→, LA〉 be the transition system of an abstract system and
3r : SC → SA be a refinement map. We say thatMC is a WEB refinement ofMA
with respect to r, if there exists a binary relation B, such that 〈∀s ∈ SC :: sBr(s)〉
and B is a WEB on TS 〈SC⊎SA,
C
−→ ⊎
A
−→,L〉, where L(s) = LA(r(s)) for s ∈ SC
and L(s) = LA(s) otherwise.
The definition depends on the notion of a WEB (Well-founded Equivalence
Bisimulation) [16], which given a binary relation B checks that any pair of states
related by B have identical behaviors up to finite stuttering.
Definition 3. B ⊆ S × S is a WEB on M = 〈S,−→, L〉 iff:
1. B is an equivalence relation on S and
2. 〈∀s, w ∈ S : sBw : L(s) = L(w)〉 and
3. There exist functions rankl : S × S → N, rankt : S × S → W , such that
〈W,≺〉 is well-founded, and
〈∀s, u, w ∈ S : sBw ∧ s→ u :
(a) 〈∃v : w → v : uBv〉 ∨
(b) (uBw ∧ rankt(u) ≺ rankt(s)) ∨
(c) 〈∃v : w → v : sBv ∧ rankl(v, s) < rankl(w, s)〉〉
WEB refinement is equivalent to stuttering bisimulation refinement [16], but
requires only local reasoning. This locality is the key that allows us to design
efficient algorithms for testing via refinement, because it reduces the refinement
problem, which is naturally expressed in terms of infinite traces (that the be-
haviors of the concrete system are allowed by the abstract system), to a problem
expressed in terms of states and their successors.
3 Running Example
In this section, we describe our running example, a 3-stage pipeline processor,
MA, and the instruction set architecture, ISA, the abstract specification for
the MA machine. The running example will be used to explain our refinement-
based approach to testing. We say that the MA implements the ISA only if all
observable behaviors of the MA are behaviors of the ISA machine.
The stages of the MA pipelined processor are (1) fetch stage: the machine
fetches an instruction pointed to by the program counter (2) load stage: the
machine loads the source registers from the register file or the data memory (3)
execute stage: the machine executes the instruction and updates the destination
register in the register file or data memory with the result. The MA machine
checks for data dependencies between adjacent instructions in the pipeline; in
case the destination of the instruction in execute stage is equal to a source
register of the instruction in the load stage, the MA machine stalls for one cycle.
The ISA machine acts as the specification for the MA machine. It just fetches
the instruction pointed to by program counter and executes it in a single step.
Notice that both the MA machine and the ISA machine are deterministic.
44 Testing via Refinement
In this section, we show how to test our running example using WEB refinement.
The idea is simple: we simulate the design using a test suite of programs. A
program is run simultaneously on the ISA and the MA machines and at each
step, we check the refinement conjecture.
Let us contrast our approach with prevailing methods used in industry, which
include the use of assertions and test cases [11]. To use these methods, a team of
engineers is needed to define a set of properties, a set of tests, and oracles that
determine when a test passes or fails. With our refinement-based methodology,
we only check one property, the WEB refinement property, and the oracle is
simply the high-level abstract model (ISA). Our approach can therefore lead to
significant savings of time and effort. Our approach has the added advantage
that refinement completely characterizes functional correctness, whereas with
traditional methods, completeness is very difficult, if not practically impossible,
to achieve. We discuss this aspect in more detail in Section 6.
We do not claim that our approach completely eliminates the need for other
testing methods. It does not, e.g., low-level tests and properties that check per-
formance are needed. Also, we expect that directed tests will be needed to achieve
sufficient code coverage. Nevertheless, we believe that the need for such tests will
be significantly reduced if refinement-based testing is used. We provide evidence
for this claim in Section 5.
We describe an algorithm for testing the WEB refinement property in Algo-
rithm 1. The algorithm is an online algorithm, i.e., we are checking refinement
as the simulation is taking place. It is possible to modify the algorithm to obtain
an offline version, which takes as input the trace of the concrete system and the
abstract system. The online version has several benefits over the offline version,
e.g., it is simpler to describe, we do not need to store traces and we can report
errors as soon as they are discovered. An offline algorithm may be easier to in-
corporate in an existing flow and may be easier to parallelize. In section 5 We
describe a variation of the offline algorithm to check the functional correctness
of an open source pipeline processor.
We make one simplifying assumption in Algorithm 1: no pair of abstract
states are labeled identically. This is a reasonable assumption, as usually one
models abstract states as tuples of state components with the labeling function
as the identity function. Such systems trivially satisfy our assumption. With this
assumption, we can simply define the equivalence relation B for checking WEB
refinement as the equivalence classes induced by the refinement map.
Algorithm 1 accepts as input an initial state s of the concrete system; n,
a bound on the number of simulation steps to run; r, a refinement map; and
rankt , a function that maps states of the concrete system to a well-founded
domain (typically the natural numbers). We start by initializing the abstract
machine state w to be r(s) (i.e., we apply the refinement map to s), the error
flag to false , the list partition to 〈〉 (the empty list) and the two index variables
i and j to 0. Next the algorithm loops as long as no error has been detected and
n, the bound on the number of simulation steps to take, is positive. An inductive
5invariant at line 2 is w = r(s). The body of the loop starts by selecting u to
be a successor state for s (Select-concrete-next-state). If the concrete machine is
nondeterministic, there can be many successors of state s. The correctness of the
algorithm does not depend on which state is selected, but as a practical matter,
it makes sense to select states randomly using an appropriate distribution. We
assume that we can replay the selections of u, say because u depends on a
pseudo-random number generator, but to simplify the presentation, this is not
explicitly mentioned in our algorithm. Next the algorithm finds an abstract state
v that is a successor of w and that matches u (i.e., v = r(u)), if such a matching
state exists, and sets match to true (Match-abstract-next-state). How this is
done depends on the abstract system. For example, if the abstract system has
bounded non-determinism, one simple strategy is to iterate over the successors of
w, stopping when a matching state is found. If no such state exists, then match
is set to false and v can be any abstract state. From an algorithmic correctness
perspective, it is crucial that Match-abstract-next-state always finds a matching
state if it exists. If such a v exists, then the test in line 5 holds and u is matched
in one step. In this case, we update partition, a list of pairs of indices, where
the ith pair contains the indices of states in the concrete and abstract traces
corresponding to the beginning of the ith partition.
Theorem 1 If Algorithm 1 reports an error, then the concrete machine is not
a WEB refinement of the abstract machine with respect to the refinement map.
Due to space limitations, the proof is omitted. Notice that given a refinement
map r and a rank function, Algorithm 1 only checks local conditions: the relation
between a concrete state s, its successor, an abstract state w and its successor.
4.1 Optimizations for Deterministic Machines
Algorithm 1 works even when the concrete and abstract machines are nondeter-
ministic. However, it is often the case that the abstract and concrete machines
are deterministic. The algorithm can be simplified by exploiting determinism.
In Figure 1 we show what the WEB refinement conjecture can be simplified to
when the machines are deterministic and the abstract machine does not stutter.
In the figure, SC is the set of states of the concrete machine; concrete-step is
the function corresponding to one step of the concrete machine; SA is the set
of abstract states of the abstract machine; and abstract-step is the step function
of the abstract machine. For deterministic machines, the match-abstract-next-
state and select-concrete-next-state functions in Algorithm 1 can be replaced
by functions abstract-step and concrete-step, respectively. Furthermore, in case
of deterministic machines, it always suffices to use 〈N, <〉 as the well-founded
structure.
In our running example, the MA and ISA machine are both deterministic and
the ISA machine does not stutter; hence, we can use the simplified algorithm.
Next we define a refinement map r, a function from MA states to ISA states that
tells us what is observable in a concrete state. Given an MA state, the refinement
map r invalidates all partially completed instructions in the pipeline, updates
6Algorithm 1: Online WEB refinement Check
Input : s: concrete system state
n: number of steps to run
r: refinement map
rankt : rank of concrete state
Output: Partition, Error Status
1 w ← r(s); error ← false; partition ← 〈〉; i← 0; j ← 0;
2 do
3 u← Select-concrete-next-state(s);
4 〈match, v〉 ← Match-abstract-next-state(w, u) ;
5 if match
6 partition← partition :: 〈i, j〉;
7 i← i+ 1 ; j ← j + 1;
8 s← u ; w ← v;
9 else if r(u) = w ∧ rankt(u) ≺ rankt(s)
10 i← i+ 1;
11 s← u;
12 else error ← true ;
13 n← n− 1;
14 while n > 0 ∧ ¬error ;
15 return 〈partition , error〉;
the program counter and projects out the programmer observable components
of the state. If neither latch is valid (the pipeline is empty) then the program
counter stays the same. Otherwise, it points to the oldest valid instruction in
the pipeline (the instruction in the second latch is older than the instruction in
the first latch). Furthermore, since no two states of the ISA machine are labeled
identically, we define B to be the equivalence relation induced by refinement
map r. The choice of a refinement map plays a crucial role in the efficiency of
the algorithm. We discuss this in detail in Section 6.
〈∀s ∈ SC :: u = concrete-step(s) ∧
w = r(s) ∧
v = abstract-step(w) ∧ v 6= r(u)
=⇒ w = r(u) ∧ rankt(u) < rankt(s)
Fig. 1: A simplified WEB refinement conjecture
Next we define the function rankt in Definition 3; given an MA state s
rankt(s) is the number of MA steps required to commit an instruction, i.e.,
take an observable step, from s. If s has a valid instruction in the second latch,
rankt = 0; otherwise if there is a valid instruction in the latch for the load stage,
rankt = 1. As we discuss later, the ranking functions are not essential for our
refinement-based testing method, but their use can help catch errors, including
7performance errors. In case a rank function is not available, the algorithm can
still be used by removing all references to rankt . The check relating u, and w in
Algorithm 1 is the safety component and the check rankt(u) < rankt(s) is the
liveness component.
4.2 Overhead of checking WEB refinement
We now discuss the overhead of checking for WEB refinement during simulation.
The overhead costs of checking the WEB refinement conjecture are indicated
with a box in Algorithm 1. The cost is primarily determined by the following
three factors: (1) computing the refinement map (2) comparing the result of
applying the refinement map to an abstract state, and (3) computing the rank
of a concrete state.
Refinement maps can be computationally expensive functions; hence, the
choice of refinement map plays a crucial role in the efficiency of the algorithm.
The refinement map described in Section 4 is obtained by committing an MA
state and projecting out the programmer visible components. To efficiently com-
pute the committed state, we instrument the machine using history variables,
variable that record the history of programmer-observable components, but do
not affect the behavior of the processor. In the MA machine, history variables
record the values of the observable components of MA states before they are
updated in the pipeline. Notice that for the MA machine, the program counter
is the only observable component of the concrete state that is updated by a par-
tially executed instruction. We evaluate the overhead cost of WEB-refinement
checking during dynamic validation in section 5 and refer the reader to [22,19] for
a detailed comparison of computational efficiency of different refinement maps
in formal verification.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we first evaluate the effectiveness of our method to test the func-
tional correctness of the MA machine, our running example, and a small hyper-
visor [4]. We evaluate the effectiveness of our method in detecting mutations and
the overhead costs of refinement checking during simulation1. The MA machine
and the hypervisor, and the corresponding WEB refinement checkers based on
Algorithm 1 are defined in ACL2s, the ACL2 Sedan. Next we evaluate the ease
of applying the refinement-based testing methodology to an existing workflow.
Towards this, we use the our method to analyze the functional correctness of a
5-stage pipeline processor based on RISC-V instruction set architecture [1]. The
processor model is described in Scala and the refinement checker is implemented
in Python.
5.1 MA machine
In total we injected 25 errors in different components of the MA machine. These
errors can roughly be classified into three classes: (1) Instruction classification:
1
Experimental artifacts are available on request.
8mutations injected in classifying instructions as an arithmetic/logic unit (ALU)
instruction, a load/store instruction, or a particular register is meaningful for
the instruction; (2) Datapath: mutations injected in computations in ALU and
load/store unit (LSU). This class also includes mutations in connecting the ports
of the modules; (3) Control logic: mutations injected in detecting stall conditions
and stalling the pipeline on data and structure hazards, error in branch recovery
mechanism like invalidating instructions in the pipeline on the wrong path, etc.
If we were to check functional correctness of the MA machine using the
property-based approach, we would first specify a set of properties to ensure
absence of each of the possible bugs. For example, we will have to specify a
set of properties to ensure that the machine correctly handles pipeline hazards
due to data dependencies between two instructions in the pipeline. For the MA
machine, the property can be stated informally as follows: if the two pipeline
latches have valid instructions, and if the older register has data dependency on
the younger instruction, i.e., the destination register of the older instruction is
equal to any of the two source registers of the younger instruction, then a stall
signal is asserted in the next cycle. In addition, we need another property that
ensures that if the stall signal is asserted in a cycle, the program counter does not
change in the next cycle. Similarly, we would need to specify a property for each
possible scenario that we want to check during simulation. These properties are
then compiled as runtime monitors that check for violations during simulations-
based testing.
In contrast, in our approach we specify and check the WEB refinement con-
jecture (Figure 1) using a test program as input and Algorithm 1. Our test suite
consisted of four generic programs: copy an array of memory from one location
to another, perform multiplication by iterative addition, perform exponentia-
tion by iterative multiplication, and a short sequence of 10 random addition and
subtraction instructions. Notice that our test programs are generic and are not
crafted to find any particular error. In an industrial setting, we would expect to
have a larger set of programs, which will only make it easier to find errors. Table
2a lists the errors injected in the MA machine. If the bug was detected by refine-
ment testing, we indicate this with a  mark in the second column of the table.
In total 18 of the 25 injected errors were detected. Notice that three of the errors
marked * in Table 2a are not functional bugs and all of these errors falsely detect
pipeline data hazards, resulting in stalling behavior that is not necessary. This is
a loss of performance, but not a functional failure. Error in decoding that bez (a
conditional branch instruction) uses rb as one of the source register (mutation
7) and error in checking the validity of a branch instruction while invalidating a
pipeline latch (mutation 14) are functional bugs that with a more well-rounded
set of programs are easy to detect. We also added two difficult-to-detect muta-
tions. One is a failure to stall the pipeline when the values of the two operands
are equal (mutation 15) or when the value of an operand is an arbitrary value
(mutation 16). The probability of stumbling on these bugs during testing is low
(as is the probability of a designer introducing these bugs). Finding such errors
requires the use of advanced counter-example generation techniques [8].
9Errors Injected Detect
Instruction classification
1. sub not an alu-op 
2. add not an alu-op 
3. mul not an alu-op 
4. load not a load-op 
5. loadi not a load-op 
6. store inst does not use rb 
7. bez inst does not use rb ×
Control: Stall Mechanism
8. do not check if an inst is valid ×*
9. do not check if an inst has a valid dest reg ×*
10. error in checking equality of dest and source reg ra 
11. error in checking equality of dest and source reg rb 
12. do not check if the op uses rbp ×*
Control: Pipeline hazard detection
13. error in invalidating younger inst on a taken branch 
14. error in checking validity of a branch instruction ×
15. do not stall if the ra-val and rb-val are equal ×
16. do not stall if ra-val has a random value ×
Arithmetic-logic unit
17. error in addition 
18. error in subtraction 
19. error in multiplication 
20. swapped ra and rb ports in a pipeline latch 
21. swapped ra-val and rb-val ports in a pipeline latch 
Load store unit
22. swap data and address ports for a store op 
23. fuse data and address ports for a store op 
24. fuse data and address ports for a load op 
25. error in address calculation for data memory access 
(a) Mutations injected
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(b) Overhead cost of refinement checker
Fig. 2: Refinement checker for MA machine
We now analyze the overhead cost to check for WEB refinement in simulation.
In Figure 2b, we plot the running times for simulating the MA machine (x-axis)
vs the running times for simulation with refinement testing enabled (y-axis). The
points shown indicate simulations ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 steps. The slop
of the fitting line is ∼2, which amounts to a slowdown of approximately 100%.
Also notice that the points in the plot are on either on the fitting line or near
it, indicating that the overhead of the checker does not increase as we increase
the number of steps in a simulation run.
5.2 Simple Hypervisor
A hypervisor enables multiple operating systems (guests) to share resources
without interfering with one another. It achieves this by virtualizing the host
processor and the memory; a guest executing on a virtualized system only ex-
hibits behaviors that are admissible when the guest is executing directly on the
hardware. In this case study, we implement a model of a simple hypervisor [4]
and check its functional correctness using WEB refinement in ACL2s.
A run of the virtualized system is defined as follows: The host processor is
time shared among multiple guests. At any given time, only one guest is active
(current guest) on the host processor. The hypervisor configures the host proces-
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sor to execute in user mode, irrespective of the mode of operation requested by
the current guest, and to use the shadow page-table of the current guest in the
host memory. The current guest directly executes instructions in the instruction
memory on the host processor until execution of an instruction results in an
exception. In case the exception is “real”, i.e., it is not a result of the guest ex-
ecuting in a virtualized environment, the hypervisor passes the exception to the
guest. The exception is then handled by the exception handler designated by the
guest. Otherwise, the exception handled by the hypervisor; the hypervisor saves
the state of the host processor in the processor control block (pcb) for the cur-
rent guest, emulates the instruction, updates the pcb and shadow page-table (if
required), and finally restores the state of the host processor using the updated
pcb. The hypervisor hosts each guest memory into disjoint regions of the host
memory2 and controls the translation from a guest virtual address to physical
address.
A simple high-level abstract system where each guest executes on a dedicated
processor and memory, serves as a specification for the virtualized system. In-
formally, the virtualized system is correct if an observable behavior of a guest in
the virtualized system is identical to the observable behavior of the guest in the
abstract system. We encode the function correctness of the virtualized system
using WEB refinement. First we define the refinement map; it extracts the state
of the current guest from combination of the state of the host processor and
the current guest’s pcb in the hypervisor. For all other guests, the corresponding
pcb in the hypervisor completely specifies the state of the guest in the abstract
system. The refinement map also extracts the guest memory partition for each of
the guest from the host memory. Next we define the well-founded structure and
the ranking functions. Notice that the abstract system does not stutter. Hence,
like in the pipeline processor case study, we only need to define one ranking func-
tion, rankt to account for stuttering in the concrete system. Furthermore, since
the concrete system is deterministic, it suffices to use 〈N, <〉 as the well-founded
structure. We define the rankt as follows: if there is no pending exception in
a MA state, the rank is 1 else it is 0. Under these conditions, we can use the
simplified WEB refinement in Figure 1.
Mutations: We manually injected mutations in the virtualized system to eval-
uate the effectiveness of refinement testing to detect bugs. In this case study,
we restrict our attentions to mutations in the hypervisor component of the vir-
tualized system. The mutations are informally classified into four classes: (1)
Save/Restore: mutations injected in save and restore routines of the host pro-
cessor state in the hypervisor; (2) Emulation of a privilege instruction: mutations
injected in hypervisor routines that emulate the execution of privileged instruc-
tions; (3) Shadow Page Table: mutations injected in hypervisor routines that
sync the shadow page-table with the guest page-table; (4) Address Calculation:
mutations injected in the address calculations performed during the translation
2 For simplicity we assume that host memory is greater than sum of all guest memory
plus memory required to store data-structures for the hypervisor.
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of guest virtual address to host physical address. Table 3a shows that refinement
testing found all of these errors.
Errors Injected Detect
Save/Restore
1. wrong pc for inst responsible for exception 
2. wrong page-table origin 
3. check for host mode instead of guest mode 
Emulation of Privileged Inst
4. wrong pc used to fetch the inst to emulate 
5. do not increment pc on a move immediate value to PTO 
6. do not increment pc on a move immediate value to PTL 
Sync Shadow Page Table
7. use old pto to sync GPT and SPT 
8. use old ptl to sync GPT and SPT 
Address calculation
9. physical addr of guest pte in handling page-faults 
10. addr of page-table entry in host page-table 
11. addr of page-table entry in SPT 
Hosting multiple guests
12. Scheduler preempting a guest 
13. Guest memory separation 
Others
14. Fail to update the exception status after emulation 
(a) Mutations injected
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Fig. 3: Refinement checker for the Hypervisor
In Figure 3b, we plot the running time for simulating the virtualized system
with (y-axis) and without refinement checker (x-axis), where the number of
steps ranges from 10,000 to 100,000. The slope of the fitting line (blue) is ∼ 65.
The reason for the large slow down is the sub-procedure in the refinement map
used to compute the guest memory from the host memory; it traverses the
host memory and extracts the guest memory for each guest in the system. If
the size of the memory is large, which is often the case, this is prohibitively
expensive. To reduce the cost of computing the refinement map, we add a history
variable to the virtualized system that records the guests accesses to the host
memory. Note that augmenting the system with the history variable does not
modify its observable behavior. We then modify the refinement map to use the
history variable to construct the updated guest memory from the initial guest
memory. We again compare the running times for simulating the virtualized
system with and without the modified refinement map. In this case the slope of
the fitting line (green) is ∼ 3.6, i.e., we get over 18 times speed up in the running
time of the virtualized system with the modified WEB refinement check. This
experiment reaffirms that the refinement map plays a crucial role designing an
efficient refinement checker.
Notice that in a property-based testing methodology, we would have to de-
scribe a property for each of the mutations described in Table 3a. Furthermore,
even such a list of properties is not complete, e.g., it does not check that after
handling an exception, the hypervisor eventually resumes executing the guest
on the host processor directly. In contrast, WEB refinement check accounts for
such liveness properties of the hypervisor.
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5.3 RISC-V Based Pipelined Processors
We next evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology to check functional cor-
rectness of pipeline processors based on RISC-V instruction set specfication [1].
RISC-V is an open source specification, which is being widely adopted both for
educational and commercial use. Among several open source implementations
available, we choose to evaluate our methodology using the Sodor processor col-
lection, a collection of 2, 3, and 5-stage pipeline processor models [2]. These
processors implement the RISC-V 32-bit integer base user-level instructions us-
ing different micro-architectural features. The models are described in Chisel,
a hardware description language embedded in Scala; it then can be translated
to either a fast bit and cycle-accurate C++ simulator or a low-level Verilog
description suitable for hardware emulation [7]. The open source community
has also developed Spike, an executable model of the RISC-V instruction set
specification, that serves as “golden standard” for execution. In addition, the
community has also developed an extensive testing infrastructure consisting of
several directed tests and benchmark programs. These tests are described in
C and can be compiled to execute on both the Spike and Sodor processors.
We evaluate the applicability of the refinement-based testing methodology to
check functional correctness of the 5-stage pipeline Sodor processor (5SP). It is
a single-issue in-order pipeline processor that supports full bypassing between
functional units. We use Spike as a high-level abstract specification for checking
functional correctness of the Sodor processor.
As in the previous two case studies (Section 5.1 and 5.2), the correctness of
the 5SP processor can be specified by a single WEB refinement check. Moreover,
the 5SP processor and the Spike are deterministic systems and the later does not
stutter; hence we can use the simplified WEB refinement conjecture (Figure 1)
to design an efficient runtime checker.
Before we discuss the challenges in implementation of the refinement checker
for the 5SP processor, we first define the refinement map r, and the ranking
function rankt . Refinement map r takes as an input a state of the 5SP proces-
sor, invalidates all partially executed instructions, then based on the number of
partially executed instructions it moves the program counter back, and finally
projects all programmer-observable components to return a state of the Spike.
In order to efficiently compute the refinement map, we instrument the proces-
sor implementation using history variables. We add a valid bit corresponding to
each pipeline latch; the valid bit is set to true if the instruction in the pipeline
stage is valid. In addition, we also record the program counter for each partially
executed instruction in the pipeline. The instrumentation of the 5SP processor
to add these history variables required only a few additional lines of code. Next,
we define the ranking function rankt . Given a state of the 5SP processor, its
rank is defined by the minimum number of steps the processor needs to commit
a partially executed instruction, i.e., take an observable step.
Now we are ready to discuss the implementation of the WEB refinement
checker. Notice that the use of Algorithm 1 to implement the refinement checker
requires a mechanism to control the stepping of both the 5SP processor and
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Spike (Line 3 and 4 in Algorithm 1). Though possible (as in the previous two case
studies), it would involve substantial modifications to the existing simulation and
testing infrastructure of Sodor processors, an undesirable scenario for adoption of
the refinement-based testing methodology. Therefore, we design an alternative
implementation of the refinement checker that decouples the execution of the
5SP processor, the Spike simulator, and the computation of WEB refinement
check. We spawn three independent threads: (1) the concrete system (Sodor
processor) simulation; (2) the abstract system (Spike) simulation; and (3) the
refinement checker. Thread (1) and (2) acts as producers and thread (3) acts
as the consumer; the communication between the producers and the consumer
is asynchronous. This alternative implementation only requires a mechanism in
the simulator to communicate its state to the refinement checker in each cycle.
For the 5SP simulator and the Spike simulator that are implemented in C++,
this is done by simply adding printf statements.
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Fig. 4: Overhead cost for the 5-stage pipeline Sodor processor
We implement the WEB refinement checker in Python. The refinement checker
spawns off the 5SP simulator and the Spike simulator as independent processes.
In each cycle, the simulator write the state of the system into a FIFO. The
refinement checker reads the state of the system from the FIFOs and checks if
the WEB refinement conjecture holds. Recall that the WEB refinement check is
local and thus only needs to analyze the current state of the systems and their
successors. In case the checker detects a violation, it outputs the offending state
and quits. Else it evicts the analyzed states of the system from the respective
FIFOs. In Figure 4, we plot the running time for simulating the 5SP with (y-
axis) and without (x-axis) the refinement checker; the number of cycles range
from 300000 to 1500000. The slope of the fitting line is ∼1.8, which amounts
to a slowdown of approximately 80%. The memory footprint of the refinement
checker is small; this is because the WEB refinement check is local and only
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requires us to analyze states and their successors. Also notice that points on the
plot are either on the fitting line, or near it; this indicates that the overhead cost
of the refinement checker does not increase with increase in the number of cycles
in a simulation run. This is desirable property in long running simulations.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the refinement-based testing methodology to
detect bugs, we introduced 20 mutations in 5-state pipeline Sodor processor.
These mutations are similar to the ones introduced in the MA machine (Ta-
ble 2a). We use the generic programs like quick sort and the tower of Hanoi
puzzle in the RISC-V test suite [3]. With this test suite, the refinement checker
could detect all mutations that could result in functional violations.
6 Discussion and Related Work
In this section, we discuss how our refinement-based testing overcomes several
major drawbacks of the standard testing methods. In the previous section, we
showed that the formal refinement conjecture can be compiled into an efficient
runtime check that can be used to detect bugs in a dynamic validation work-
flow. Furthermore, unlike temporal properties, that can span multiple steps of
the machine, WEB-refinement check is local, i.e., we only check the relation
between a state and its successor. This allows us to limit the overhead cost
without compromising on the expressivity. The overhead of a refinement checker
during simulation can further be improved by exploiting domain specific knowl-
edge (deterministic machines), augmenting the machine with appropriate history
variables, choosing an efficient refinement map, and checking only for the safety
or the liveness component of the refinement check. In contrast, in a property-
based methodology, properties are expressed in an assertion language, like SVA
and PSL, and compiled into a (finite-state) automaton. In the worst case, the
automaton can be exponential in the size of the property and the overhead of
checking the property during simulation can be prohibitively expensive. In [24],
it is reported that depending on the number and the kind of properties they
express, property checking can degrade simulation speed anywhere from 25% to
100%.
A major concern with current testing methods is how to decide if the set of
properties or tests is “complete.” An alert reader would have noticed that the set
of properties corresponding to the mutations in Section 5.1 does not include the
one that checks that if the pipeline in the MA machine stalls, say due to data de-
pendency, it is eventually un-stalled and resumes fetching new instructions. With
this incomplete set of properties, an MA machine that never resumes fetching
new instructions will be incorrectly declared as functionally correct. As systems
grow in complexity, it becomes increasingly difficult to answer the question of
completeness. In [14], the authors describe their experience in a twenty person
year effort to formally verify the Execution Cluster, a component of the Intel
Core i7 microprocessor that is responsible for functional behavior of all microin-
structions. It is reported that at the end of their effort they only missed detecting
five bugs found in the fabricated processor. They attributed three of these misses
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to “incorrect formal specification” and two of these misses to “formal verifica-
tion work not being completed early enough”. Both reasons are indicative of
the difficulty in specifying a correct and complete set of properties for complex
designs. An industry-wide survey in 2014 shows that over 50% of respins are
due to logic or functional errors; 40% of these functional flaws are attributed
to incorrect/incomplete specifications [11]. In contrast, WEB-refinement com-
pletely characterizes the functional correctness of the design and therefore does
not suffer from the incompleteness problem.
In section 4, the locality of WEB refinement conjecture (reasoning only about
states and their successors) played a key part in designing an efficient runtime
checker. This quality of WEB refinement also makes it amenable for automated
reasoning using existing formal verification tools [19,20]. Hence, refinement-based
approach satisfies a key requirement: a specification must be effectively analyzed
both in a dynamic validation workflow as well as in a formal verification work-
flow. The advantage of such a specification is that it acts as a bridge between
dynamic validation and formal verification.
Finally, we note that our refinement-based testing can be used in a variety
of ways to combine dynamic and static verification methods. For example, we
might prove that a high-level, abstract system satisfies a set of desired properties.
This is much easier to do at the abstract level than at the concrete level. If
we can statically show that concrete system refines the high-level system, say
using WEB refinement, then, since WEB refinement preserves all the CTL∗\X
properties (both safety and liveness properties), we can infer that the concrete
system satisfies all the temporal properties that were validated for the abstract
system. Such a proof may be difficult to perform. Instead, we can use refinement-
based testing to gather evidence that the concrete system refines the abstract
system. .
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we introduced a refinement-based methodology for testing func-
tional correctness of hardware systems and low-level software. We showed that
our methodology is effective in detecting bugs and can be easily integrated in
existing simulation workflows. We introduced an effective algorithm for checking
WEB refinement during simulation. For future work, we plan to explore the use
of refinement-based testing to check the functional correctness of nondetermin-
istic systems. Also the notion of WEB refinement is compositional and supports
top-down stepwise refinement methodology; we plan to explore how to fully ex-
ploit the compositionality of refinement to test complex, hierarchical designs
with external IP components.
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